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DEVELOPING A PRECISE DEFINITION: THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES THE SCOPE OF
THE “IN CONNECTION WITH”
REQUIREMENT UNDER SLUSA
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA) in 1998 as an effort to close a loophole from the 1995 enactment
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).1 Under the
PSLRA, plaintiffs filing class action securities fraud cases in federal court
became subject to heightened pleading requirements and other procedural
hurdles, thereby making it more difficult to bring such claims.2 Plaintiffs’
attorneys, however, circumvented the procedural obstacles simply by filing
claims in state court, often alleging violations of state law.3 Plaintiffs’
ability to file these claims in state court undermined the strength and
purpose of the PSLRA,4 that is, to “weed out non-meritorious actions at the
pleadings stage, [and] discourag[e] strike suits.”5 Congress became aware
of this “unintended consequence”6 of the PSLRA and in response, enacted
SLUSA to preempt many state-law claims for securities fraud class
actions.7
SLUSA closed the gap that the PSLRA inadvertently left open because
it preempted many state-law claims for securities fraud litigation. Congress
intended for SLUSA to help end abuses in bringing class action suits that
often targeted deep-pocketed defendants, were frivolous, and in the
aggregate, threatened the United States securities markets.8 Prior to
SLUSA’s enactment, the ever-increasing costs of defending class action
suits led corporations to “[become] quick to settle rather than to fight

1. Rex M. Shannon III, Securities Fraud-Federal Preemption-SLUSA Preempts State-Law
Class Actions Brought by Holders of Covered Securities, 76 MISS. L.J. 323, 331 (2006).
2. Jennifer O’Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If it
Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is it a Securities
Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 335 (2004).
3. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 978 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12–88); Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud:
Gatekeepers in State Court, DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 487 (2011).
4. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507.
5. O’Hare, supra note 2, at 336.
6. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507.
7. O’Hare, supra note 2, at 352–53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[C]ourts have had to
determine what class actions are preempted by SLUSA. To answer this question, the great
majority of courts have looked to the statute’s plain language and adopted a four-part test. Under
this test, SLUSA applies if the defendant can show that (1) the suit is a covered class action, (2)
the plaintiff’s claims are based on state law, (3) there has been a purchase or sale of a covered
security, and (4) the plaintiff has alleged a misrepresentation or omission of material fact ‘in
connection with’ the purchase or sale of such security.”).
8. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507.
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meritless claims and bear the expense of litigation.”9 Corporations faced a
difficult predicament—they could spend an exorbitant amount of money
defending a meritless suit or they could spend a somewhat less exorbitant
amount of money settling the suit. Corporate defendants, concerned with
their bottom lines, their shareholders, and maintaining their good names and
reputations, often settled as the better of two poor alternatives.10 SLUSA
acted as a means to bolster the PSLRA’s goal of protecting “the integrity of
American capital markets” and preventing the system from being
“undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits.”11
One of SLUSA’s key provisions “prohibit[s] private parties from
bringing covered class actions based on state law in either state or federal
court when such actions allege fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of covered securities.”12 Thus, SLUSA effectively closes the loophole
created by the PSLRA by prohibiting securities fraud class action litigation
based on state law from proceeding in state or federal court. This forces the
remaining, permissible securities class action litigation based on federal law
to be subject to the heightened pleading standards required by the PSLRA.
The statute’s “in connection with” language “serves as the essential nexus
between the fraud and the securities transaction.”13 As such, plaintiffs must
allege that the particular fraud at hand was connected on a certain level to
the purchase or sale of the securities. When the alleged fraud is “sufficiently
detached” from a securities transaction, the requirement is not met and the
class action may survive dismissal at the pleadings stage and proceed as a
state-law claim.14 The relevant inquiry in these cases is assessing “deception
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, not deception of an
identifiable purchaser or seller.”15 The “in connection with” requirement
9. Ethan H. Townsend, One Nation, Under Securities Fraud? The Third Circuit Notches a
Win for Federalism in In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1059,
1064 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, INVESTING IT; Making it Harder for Investors to Sue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/10/business/investing-it-making-itharder-for-investors-to-sue.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Leslie Eaton, Class-Action Lawsuits
by Investors Are Not Turning out Exactly as Congress Planned., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/27/business/class-action-lawsuits-investors-are-not-turningexactly-congress-planned.html.
11. Townsend, supra note 9, at 1065 n.37 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995));
see also Jeffrey W. Apel, Eliminating Claims That Jeopardize the Stature of American Capital
Markets, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 605, 607 (2007). There is certainly some inherent risk to
investing in companies listed on the American stock exchanges, but the added risk of corporations
having to defend strike suits should not be added to the already complex mix of risks that
investors consider when deciding to invest in those particular companies. Id.
12. Shannon, supra note 1, at 323 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (1998)).
13. Apel, supra note 11, at 609.
14. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657 (1997).
15. Id. at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ensures that the relationship between the fraud and the securities transaction
is not too attenuated, as is often the case in strike suits.16 SLUSA thus
makes it more difficult for the plaintiffs’ bar to bring class action securities
fraud claims because the statute contains a parallel provision,17 stating,
“Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered
security . . . shall be removable to the Federal district court.”18 Once
removed, it is consequently subject to dismissal under the PSLRA.19
The remainder of this note will trace the legislation leading up to the
passage of SLUSA and subsequently will evaluate the Fifth Circuit’s
application in Roland v. Green of the key SLUSA provision—that the
alleged fraud be “in connection with” the securities transaction.20 Part II
describes the history and background leading to Congress’ 1998 enactment
of SLUSA. Part III explains that, because the question of determining the
scope of the “in connection with” requirement and the “coincide” language
found in SEC v. Zandford21 and in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Dabit22 was a matter of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, the court
necessarily had to develop a test to apply the standard. Part III further
analyzes how other circuit courts have tried to give dimension to the
“coincide” requirement. Part IV of this note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s
adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation supports both legislative intent
and the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the “in connection with”
language and consequently offers the intended protection to corporate
defendants in securities fraud class action litigation.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF SLUSA
Following the stock market crash of 1929, Congress sought to
strengthen investor confidence in the national securities markets23 and to
protect such markets through the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.24 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
16. A strike suit is one in which plaintiffs file a frivolous or non-meritorious suit for the
purpose of extracting a high settlement from the corporate defendants. See O’Hare, supra note 2,
at 338–39 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998)). Plaintiffs’ attorneys file suit
knowing their claim is not particularly strong, yet the massive costs of discovery and defending
the suit coerces defendants into quickly settling to get rid of the suit and to avoid potentially
massive adverse financial consequences. See id.
17. Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Spielman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring))
“Any suit removable under SLUSA’s removal provision . . . is precluded under SLUSA’s
preclusion provision . . . and any suit not precluded is not removable.” Id. This is illustrative of the
fact that “SLUSA’s removal and preclusion provisions are ‘opposite sides of the same coin.’” Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(f)(2) (1998); Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2012).
19. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507–08.
20. Id. at 503.
21. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
22. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
23. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819.
24. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78; Shannon, supra note 1, at 326.
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acting through the power that the 1934 Act granted to it,25 promulgated
Rule 10b-5, which expressly prohibited “fraud and deceit ‘in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.’”26 Specifically, Rule 10b-5 states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.27

By empowering the SEC to promulgate such a rule, Congress intended to
promote investor confidence by requiring, among other things, disclosure
and truthfulness in securities transactions.28 Decades later in 1995, though
the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 still governed modern securities transactions,
Congress addressed a new challenge. It sought to find a balance between
potentially frivolous lawsuits alleging federal securities fraud and
protecting the securities market and its investors.29
Congress had become increasingly aware of “perceived abuses of the
class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded securities”30
and passed the PSLRA as an effort to curb these practices.31 The goal of the
PSLRA was to ensure that securities fraud cases were proper and not
merely “frivolous litigation.”32 Such frivolous litigation would likely cause
excessive, inappropriate, or unwarranted harm to corporate defendants in
the form of exceedingly high litigation or settlement costs.33 Congress’
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998); Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78–79.
Shannon, supra note 1, at 327; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.
Shannon, supra note 1, at 336.
See William B. Snyder, Jr., The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA: Federal Class Actions
Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REV. 669, 696–97 (2007).
30. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81); see
also Apel, supra note 11, at 616 (explaining that Congress relied “heavily on a study published by
Stanford law professor Michael Perino, [and] took notice of the shift of plaintiffs beginning to file
their securities suits in state court as opposed to federal court”); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and
Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273,
274 (1998).
31. Shannon, supra note 1.
32. See O’Hare, supra note 2, at 337.
33. See Townsend, supra note 9, at 1065 n.37. Another critical feature of the PSLRA that
aimed to protect corporate defendants from strike suits is the stay on discovery that attaches once
defendants file a motion to dismiss. O’Hare, supra note 2, at 335.
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enactment of securities fraud legislation targeted the “tension between the
federal interest of protecting investors in nationally traded securities and the
practical need to protect normal business activity from vexatious
litigation.”34 Thus, the PSLRA came into being.
Congress had a strong interest in ensuring that securities fraud class
actions were brought in federal court because, among other reasons,
corporations were unable to detect where their securities were being traded
after the initial public offering.35 When a corporation does not know in
which states its securities are trading, it in turn does not know in which and
in how many states it will be subject to litigation should a plaintiff file suit
under state law. If plaintiffs were able to bring state-law claims,
corporations could be subject to litigation in all fifty states according to
fifty different sets of laws.36 If any one state were particularly hostile to
corporate defendants and strongly favored plaintiffs, it could “impose the
risks and costs of its peculiar litigation system on all national issuers.”37
Ultimately, these suits could topple corporations as they would be forced to
engage in extensive discovery for duplicative lawsuits in numerous states or
risk a large adverse judgment.38 With an eye toward allowing meritorious
litigation to proceed but preventing strike suits, Congress sought to enact
legislation that would balance these two competing, and often intertwined,
interests via heightened procedural requirements. Such legislation revealed
Congress’ “preference for national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities”39 as emphasized in SLUSA.
A. PLAINTIFF CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PSLRA
The heightened pleading requirements and other procedural hurdles
central to the PSLRA40 worked to prevent, or alternatively to dismiss,
frivolous cases filed in federal court. The language of the PSLRA, however,
had inadvertently created a means for plaintiffs to circumvent the tough
procedural requirements simply by filing state-law securities fraud claims in
state courts.41 Congress took note that plaintiffs’ ability to bring state-law
actions in state court “frustrate[d] the objectives of the PLSRA”42 merely by
34.
35.
36.
37.

Siepel v. Bank of America, N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1125 (8th Cir. 2008).
Roland, 675 F.3d at 517 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998)).
O’Hare, supra note 2, at 339.
Roland, 675 F.3d at 517 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998)). In addition to the
possibility of corporate defendants becoming subject to litigation in all fifty states, Congress was
particularly concerned that federal law should govern securities traded on the national markets
because investors, buying and selling securities in every state, “rely on information distributed on
a national basis.” Id. at 517–18 (citing 144 Cong. Rec. 4799 (1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Lieberman)).
38. See Siepel, 526 F.3d at 1126.
39. Roland, 675 F.3d at 517.
40. See Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 2010).
41. See id.
42. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507.
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plaintiffs’ choice of forum.43 SLUSA was enacted as a remedy to ensure
that plaintiffs could not escape the PSLRA merely by forum selection44 and
a well-pleaded complaint.45 Consequently, it became more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring state-law securities fraud cases under the new statute.46
SLUSA was to be a remedy for cases in which plaintiffs frustrated the
purpose of the PSLRA by avoiding federal court and choosing instead to
bring actions in state court. SLUSA provides, in relevant part:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any
State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal
court by any private party alleging a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.47

SLUSA ensured that most securities fraud class actions would be
brought in federal court and therefore “subject to the jurisprudence of Rule
10b-5 and the procedural requirements of the PSLRA.”48 While Congress
and the SEC had recognized the need for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights
in court, they were also seriously concerned about plaintiffs abusing the
class action system.49 Congress’ concern that “private securities fraud class
actions were injur[ing] the entire U.S. economy by rewarding nuisance
filings, targeting . . . deep-pocket defendants, [and facilitating] vexatious
discovery requests” 50 led to the enactment of SLUSA.51

43. Id.
44. See Melanie P. Goolsby, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: The Case of the Scorned Broker and the
Death of the State Securities Fraud Class Action Suit, 67 LA. L. REV. 227, 235 (2006); Shannon,
supra note 1; Perino, supra note 30, at 309.
45. Roland, 675 F.3d at 520–21 (citing Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 308
(6th Cir. 2009)). It is well established that, although the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and
he may specifically engineer the language to avoid a claim that would lead to dismissal under
SLUSA, “[c]ourts may look to—they must look to—the substance of a complaint’s allegations in
applying SLUSA. Otherwise, SLUSA enforcement would reduce to a formalistic search through
the pages of the complaint for magic words . . . and nothing more.” Id.; see also O’Hare, supra
note 2, at 344–45; Romano, 609 F.3d at 523 (“SLUSA requires our attention to both the pleadings
and the realities underlying the claims.”).
46. Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1998) (emphasis added); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 83–84 (2006) (“A ‘covered class action’ is a lawsuit in which
damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 people. A ‘covered security’ is one traded
nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange.”).
48. Johnson, supra note 3, at 488.
49. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260 Before the
Subcomm. on Secs. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 4 (1997)
[hereinafter SEC Testimony], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive
/1997/tsty1997.txt (“Although the Commission staunchly defends the right of defrauded investors
to seek meaningful relief, we are sensitive to the burdens imposed on corporations by abusive
litigation, which increases the cost of capital formation.”).
50. Instituto de Prevision Militar, 546 F.3d at 1344 (internal quotations marks omitted) (citing
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81).
51. O’Hare, supra note 2, at 338.
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Both Congress and the courts have noted that nuisance filings were
dangerous because “the costs of discovery and the risk of a massive
judgment” meant that “even a meritless lawsuit could extract a sizeable
settlement from a defendant,”52 when no such settlement may have been
warranted. Congress determined, through its passage of the PSLRA and
SLUSA, that plaintiffs seeking to line their pockets via strike suits53 against
corporations in the national securities market abused the class action system
in a way that was never intended and that ought to be curbed to prevent
unnecessary risk and harm to issuers of securities.54 Both Congress and the
courts have understood the “widespread recognition that ‘litigation under
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.’”55 As a result of
this unique aspect of Rule 10b-5 litigation, Congress and the courts felt
corporate defendants were entitled to greater protection, a result Congress
sought to attain by enacting SLUSA’s heightened pleading requirements for
plaintiffs.
B. THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE “IN CONNECTION WITH” LANGUAGE
The Supreme Court has held that the “in connection with” language
found in both SLUSA and in Rule 10b-5 should be “construed flexibly, not
technically or restrictively.”56 As the exact same language found in Rule
10b-5 is also present in both the PSLRA and SLUSA,57 Congress was
“hardly . . . unaware of the broad construction adopted by [the Supreme
Court] and the SEC.”58 It therefore intended for the language to have the
same meaning and broad scope it had in both statutes.59 While plaintiffs
seeking to recover in securities fraud class actions have often argued that
52. Siepel v. Bank of America, N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 2008); see e.g., Henriques,
supra note 10.
53. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) (“The
magnitude of the federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the market
for nationally traded securities cannot be overstated.”).
54. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, There are Plaintiffs and…There are
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355,
357 (2008); Snyder, supra note 29, at 670.
55. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739
(1975)).
56. Siepel, 526 F.3d at 1127 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)); see also
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1998). SLUSA provides that private parties are prohibited from
bringing securities fraud class actions whereupon the defendant deceived the plaintiff “in
connection with the purchase or sale” of a covered security. Id. Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud and
deceit “in connection with the purchase or sale” of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012).
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, too, prohibits manipulation or deception “in connection with the
purchase or sale” of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
58. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012); see also SEC Testimony, supra note
49, at 13 (“The fraud language of [SLUSA] tracks the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act . . . and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”).
59. Roland, 675 F.3d at 512.
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the SLUSA language should be interpreted narrowly and restrictively,60
particularly when interpreting the meaning of “in connection with,” courts
have consistently held otherwise.61 When Congress enacted SLUSA, it
recognized that it employed the exact same language as in Rule 10b-5.
Congress had done this intentionally to ensure that SLUSA would have the
same meaning, depth, and breadth as the identical language found in Rule
10b-5.62 The Supreme Court’s “express reliance” on policy considerations63
has provided the general backdrop from which the Fifth Circuit later
formulated its standard.
The Supreme Court held in Zandford and Dabit, as did numerous
circuit courts, that Congress was “aware of the terminology and meaning
attached”64 to the language when it drafted SLUSA, and thus the language’s
broad scope65 found in Section 10(b) should apply. Such a broad reading of
the language reflects both legislative intent and policy considerations,
namely, to provide a strong bulwark against abuses of class action suits and
to protect the national securities markets.66 When “in connection with” is
read broadly in the statute, it preempts more allegations of fraud based on
state law and funnels the remaining claims based on federal law through the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards in federal court. Conversely, when
interpreted narrowly, the statutory language is a weak defense against
frivolous suits67 because it allows a greater range of cases to properly be
brought and survive dismissal at the pleadings stage.
As a matter of policy, the drafters of the legislation and the courts
hearing securities fraud class actions have generally decided that it is of
primary importance to protect defendant corporations from meritless suits.
This goal is achieved by interpreting the statutory language to cast a wide
net over the alleged fraud covered by SLUSA’s “preemptive sweep.”68
Because “[t]he ‘in connection with’ requirement is a means of testing
whether the connection between securities, or even securities markets
generally, and the fraud alleged, is too attenuated,”69 it is a critical
component in determining and implementing the policy goals of the
legislation. If SLUSA’s key provisions were construed narrowly, plaintiffs
would be able to meet the heightened pleading requirements with relative
ease. Plaintiffs would properly be able to claim more instances of alleged
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See, e.g., Siepel, 526 F.3d at 1127.
See, e.g., id.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85–86 (2006).
Roland, 675 F.3d at 517.
O’Hare, supra note 2, at 365.
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).
See Apel, supra note 11, at 613.
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 86.
Id.
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 420
(3d ed. 2009) (citing Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1029 (3d Cir. 1977).
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fraud in connection with more securities transactions, and a greater degree
of vexatious litigation would threaten corporate defendants. Such a result
would make the key SLUSA provision rather inconsequential, even futile,
in its goal of strengthening the PSLRA.
Allowing more cases to slip through SLUSA’s grasp would do little to
close the gap the PSLRA left open, and would not afford sufficient
protection for securities markets. This potentially adverse consequence
reveals the legislative intent behind SLUSA as well as the SEC’s
consistently broad reading of Rule 10b-5—both Congress and the SEC
sought to protect against undermining the purpose of the statute through
their broad interpretations of the language.70 These logical inferences about
SLUSA’s underlying policy goals should be given a certain degree of
deference when courts interpret the statutory language to apply SLUSA
preclusions. A broad construction of “in connection with” serves not only to
protect individual corporate defendants from the major risk of litigating or
settling frivolous suits, but also to protect the national securities markets as
the cornerstone of the American economy.71
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES THE “COINCIDE”
LANGUAGE AS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION
The Fifth Circuit had not determined “what connection between a fraud
and transactions in covered securities is required for SLUSA preclusion to
apply,”72 and correspondingly, the meaning of the “in connection with” and
“coincide” language, until its 2012 decision of Roland v. Green.73 The
Roland court addressed a “consolidated appeal aris[ing] out of an alleged
multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.”74 The SEC and different groups of
investors alleged that defendants misrepresented the value and stability of
securities they sold to plaintiffs, resulting in staggering financial losses.75
Employing the state class action vehicle, plaintiffs sought to recover for
their losses.76 As such, the court addressed the issue of “the scope of the ‘in
connection with’ language under SLUSA [as] one of first impression.”77
The process of developing and applying a standard to interpret the statutory
language called upon the court to explore other circuit courts’
interpretations of the same language and to use those findings to inform its
analysis.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819; see Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85.
See Apel, supra note 11, at 607.
Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 506.
See id. at 508–09.
Id. at 506.
Id.
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The Fifth Circuit analyzed how the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits construed the “coincide” language that the
Dabit court required for SLUSA preclusion to apply. It then credited or
discredited varying analyses based upon whether that circuit’s particular
construction of the nexus requirement precisely met the “coincide”
language, and consequently, the “in connection with” requirement.78 The
Supreme Court’s test—whether the fraud coincides with a securities
transaction—was “not particularly descriptive,”79 and thus it rested upon the
individual circuit courts to analyze and interpret the “coincide” requirement
under SLUSA. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation and application of the
“coincide” language, though not a flawless one, best reflects the underlying
considerations that Congress, the SEC, and the courts have taken into
account since SLUSA was first enacted.80
A. SISTER CIRCUITS’ INSUFFICIENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
“COINCIDE” LANGUAGE: SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH
CIRCUITS
The Roland court noted that the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits did
not define the “in connection with” and “coincide” language succinctly and
precisely enough to assist the Fifth Circuit in developing its own standard.
The subsequent analysis presents the ineffective tests by which courts have
promulgated a meaning of the “in connection with” requirement. As will be
shown, none illustrate what it truly means for an alleged fraud to coincide
with a securities transaction.81 The relevant facts and application of law
from cases in each of the three above-mentioned circuits are discussed
below.
1. A Nexus More Intimately Related to Fraud than “Coincide”
and Failure to Define “Coincide” Itself: The Sixth and
Eighth Circuits
A particular problem the Fifth Circuit faced when assessing the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits’ standards arose when those courts failed to establish
precisely what nexus the alleged fraud and securities transaction must have
to coincide with each other, and alternatively, when such nexus is more
intimately related than coincide requires. In failing to address what it
actually means for the fraud and transaction to coincide, these courts could
not provide meaningful guidance to the Fifth Circuit, whose task was to
formulate such a demarcation in applying the SLUSA language.
78. Id. at 512.
79. Id.
80. See SEC Testimony, supra note 49, at 2 (“We commend the Subcommittee for its
continuing efforts to focus on the question of whether frivolous securities litigation threatens to
inhibit capital formation and harm investors.”).
81. Roland, 675 F.3d at 513.
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a. The Sixth Circuit: Segal v. Fifth Third Bank
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit in Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A. addressed
the “in connection with” requirement that must be met to preclude securities
fraud class actions based on state law under SLUSA. In Segal, plaintiff was
a beneficiary of trust accounts administered by defendant Fifth Third
Bank.82 In bringing a class action suit on behalf of “himself, his children,
and all beneficiaries of trust, estate, or other fiduciary accounts for which
the Bank . . . acted as a . . . corporate fiduciary,”83 plaintiff alleged that Fifth
Third breached its fiduciary and contractual duties to the class. The district
court, applying SLUSA, dismissed the action for failure to state a claim
because the action involved “fifty or more people seeking to vindicate statelaw securities-related claims,” which constituted a class action.84 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the SLUSA language was to be interpreted
broadly, as the Supreme Court recognized in Zandford and in Dabit,85 and
as Congress had intended when it drafted the legislation.86 Understanding
the Supreme Court’s use of “coincide” to be tantamount to “in connection
with,” the court held that “All of Segal’s counts—breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, breach of contract—revolve around Fifth Third’s
decision to buy mutual fund shares. Segal’s allegations do not merely
coincide with securities transactions; they depend on them.”87 The court’s
analysis clearly shows that it believed that depended on represented a much
closer nexus than did coincide. In holding that the fraud depended on the
securities transaction, the Sixth Circuit did not establish a clear standard of
what it meant for an alleged fraud and a securities transaction to coincide. It
did not draw a bright line showing the precise point where the fraud and
transaction meet the coincide test, and where such fraud and where they
escape SLUSA preclusion.
Because the court in Segal believed that the allegations did not merely
coincide with the transactions, the court did not actually define what it
means to coincide in its opinion. Rather, the court explained what it meant
for such a transaction to have a nexus to the fraud that goes beyond
coincide. Hence, the Fifth Circuit justifiably gave minimal weight to the
Sixth Circuit’s discussion of the “in connection with” requirement when
developing its own standard. Segal described only a nexus that was more
intimately related than one in which the fraud and securities transaction
coincide.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 310.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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b. The Eighth Circuit: Siepel v. Bank of America
In Siepel v. Bank of America, N.A.,88 the Eighth Circuit did not apply a
definition that precisely interpreted the coincide standard established by the
Supreme Court. Rather, the court applied a standard that most certainly
required a much closer nexus than “coincide.”89 In Siepel, the court
addressed whether SLUSA preempted “state-law claims that a trustee
breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose conflicts of interest in its
selection of nationally-traded investment securities.”90 Plaintiffs,
beneficiaries of trust accounts that Bank of America maintained, alleged,
inter alia, state-law claims in a class action suit.91 In Bank of America’s
plan to consolidate its trust management activities, its clients were
led to believe that their assets were being managed on an individualized
basis, when in fact the assets were being invested in shares of the Nations
Funds mutual fund, managed by an investment company substantially
owned by the Bank.92

Plaintiffs claimed that Bank of America had invested the assets in this
fashion to “indirectly extract additional fees and profits.”93 Further, Bank of
America sent “misleading letters to co-trustees and beneficiaries touting the
advantages of . . . Nations Funds and threatening adverse tax consequences
if the recipients objected.”94 At this time, the Bank failed to disclose the
“conflict of interest, higher expenses, and increased tax liability that would
result from Bank of America’s diversion of trust assets to Nations Funds.”95
Plaintiffs brought suit in district court, where the court dismissed the
federal claims on the merits and held the state-law claims to be precluded
by SLUSA’s reach.96 The district court found that the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts were “central”97 to
plaintiffs’ state-law claims and therefore were “in connection with” the
securities transaction.98 Because the court found the alleged fraud to be
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Siepel v. Bank of America, N.A., 526 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 1125.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1125. “Central” is defined as “containing or constituting a center . . . relevant or
pertinent to a center . . . belonging to the center as [the] most important part.” WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 363 (1993). “Coincide” is defined as “to occupy the same
place in space . . . to occur at the same time or occupy the same period of time.” WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 441 (1993).
98. The Supreme Court has never interpreted “in connection with” to mean something that is
so essential to a claim of fraud as the Eighth Circuit did when it affirmed the district court’s
interpretation of the nexus between the fraud and transaction as “central.” See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
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“central” to the transactions, SLUSA mandated dismissal.99 Fraud that is
central to a securities transaction necessarily coincides with such a
transaction because coincide encompasses a much broader array of
relationships than does central. It follows then, that if an alleged fraud is
central to a securities transaction, it must also coincide with that transaction.
The Fifth Circuit certainly did not express any doubt as to whether the
preceding logic is true; it did, however, doubt that such logic was useful
when the court needed to employ an exact definition of coincide.100 The
Eight Circuit did not entertain the idea that “central” goes far beyond
“coincide” and therefore is not a precise enough match in terms of defining
the necessary nexus between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of
the securities in question.
Such a narrow reading is contrary to the legislative history and purpose
of the SLUSA preclusion, and as such, the definition was of little use to the
Fifth Circuit in Roland.101 Because central is a much closer nexus than is
coincide, the court did not promulgate a standard to best determine the
meaning of coincide. Central fits within the much broader net of coincide,
and per the Eighth Circuit, claims central to securities transactions meet the
“in connection with” standard. However, the court does not actually explain
what it means to merely coincide, which is the necessary inquiry.
2. A Standard Too Attenuated to Satisfy the “Coincide”
Language: The Seventh Circuit’s Gavin v. AT&T Corp.
The 2006 decision of Gavin v. AT&T Corp.102 presents a case where the
plaintiff, on behalf of a class of shareholders of MediaOne Group, sued
defendants in state court after the completion of a June 2000 MediaOne and
AT&T merger. The terms of the merger entitled MediaOne shareholders to
a “Standard Election” share-cash package or other combination of “shares
and cash that would be equal in value” to the Standard Election if they
preferred.103 In three letters dated June 15, 2000, August 1, 2000, and
December 15, 2000, AT&T notified shareholders of their options to obtain
the cash or shares packages they selected.104 The final letter of December
15, which was sent to shareholders who had not responded to either of the
previous letters, reiterated that there was no deadline to exercise the
Standard Election, but that the July 14 deadline to exercise any other
options had passed. Further, though the first two letters noted that
shareholders could use the exchange service at no fee, the third reminder

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Siepel, 526 F.3d at 1125.
See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 513 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Gavin v. AT&T Corp., 464 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 637.
Id.
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letter did not reiterate that term of the agreement.105 Plaintiffs claimed that
the failure to mention the no-charge option in the third letter constituted the
alleged fraud in question.106
The Seventh Circuit, employing several colorful analogies107 to
illustrate its point, determined that the alleged fraud “happened afterwards
and had nothing . . . to do with federal securities law.”108 Instead, such
allegations dealt with “garden-variety issues of state-law consumer
fraud.”109 The test that the Seventh Circuit appears to have applied was one
that asked whether the alleged material omission of the term in the letter
involved the securities transaction.110 While the Supreme Court had used the
involving language in Dabit to provide another linguistic explanation of
what it means to be “in connection with,” the Seventh Circuit provided
minimal explanation of what it means to coincide. That involving and
coincide both explain the in connection with requirement does not
automatically mean that involving and coincide are synonymous. Here, the
court did not address what it means for the fraud and the transaction to meet
the threshold coincide test. It did, however, note that a mere but-for
relationship was insufficient.111 Hence, the Fifth Circuit justifiably
dismissed112 the Seventh Circuit’s test because the latter’s definition offered
no guidance about how to accurately interpret the key “coincide” language.
B. SISTER CIRCUITS’ MERITORIOUS TESTS: THE SECOND, NINTH,
AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS EVALUATE THE MEANING OF THE
“COINCIDE” LANGUAGE
The Fifth Circuit found most persuasive the interpretations applied by
the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in determining the meaning of the
“coincide” language as expressed by the Supreme Court in the Zandford
and Dabit cases.113 Believing these analyses to be helpful in providing
guidance for establishing its own test, the court looked to the other circuits’
tests to determine whether they appropriately circumscribed the requirement
105. Id.
106. Id. at 638.
107. See, e.g., id. at 639 (“Of course there is a literal sense in which anything that happens that
would not have happened but for some prior event is connected to that event. In that sense the
fraud of which the plaintiff complains is connected to the merger, without which there would not
have been such a fraud against the plaintiff and her class. But in the same sense the fraud is
connected to the Big Bang, without which there would never have been a MediaOne or even an
AT&T.”).
108. Id. at 638.
109. Id. at 640.
110. Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 641. Defendants could have litigated their claim in federal court had they suggested
diversity as a basis for jurisdiction; rather they “instead . . . plac[ed] all their jurisdictional eggs in
the SLUSA basket, and there [the court left] them.” Id.
113. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012).
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of the “in connection with” language based on the complex facts of the
Roland case.
1. Stringent Standards: The Second and Eleventh Circuits
a. The Eleventh Circuit: Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill
Lynch
Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch evaluated the “in
connection with” and “coincide” language in 2008.114 The court addressed
consolidated cases on appeal from the Southern District of Florida in which
the plaintiff, Instituto de Prevision Militar (IPM) sued Merrill Lynch
alleging state-law claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
fraud,115 as well as federal securities fraud.116 IPM claimed that Pension
Fund of America (PFA), a non-party, had defrauded Latin American
Investors, itself included, by self dealing. PFA held itself out as an agent of
Merrill Lynch,117 and “[r]elying upon Merrill Lynch’s reputation,” IPM
invested.118 Pursuant to the trust agreement, IPM wired over $7.7 million to
Merrill Lynch, which placed the money in an account named Pension Fund
of America.119 Subsequently, Merrill Lynch “allowed PFA to transfer more
than $3 million” from the IPM account “for its own benefit and for its
principal’s personal use.”120
In order to determine whether the misrepresentation was “in connection
with” the purchase or sale of securities, the court applied the following
standard: “[F]raud that induced IPM to invest with PFA” or “a fraudulent
scheme that . . . depended upon the purchase or sale of securities”121
satisfied the “coincide” language. The Second Circuit applied a similar
analysis in interpreting the relevant language. In both instances, the courts
employed a heightened, stringent standard, which led the circuit courts to
interpret the “in connection with” and “coincide” language of SLUSA and
the Supreme Court in Dabit and Zandford more narrowly. The policy
considerations and results of a stricter test in Instituto de Prevision Militar
mirror those that resulted from the Second Circuit’s interpretation in
Romano v. Kazacos122 as well. When the court reads the language narrowly,
there are fewer cases that can be precluded under SLUSA and subject to
dismissal. Such a result could lead to corporate defendants potentially
facing a greater risk of strike suits and meritless litigation.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id. at 1349 (emphasis added).
Romano v. Kazacoz, 609 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Fraud that depends upon the securities transaction in question raises a
similar inquiry when determining how intimate the nexus truly is when the
fraud and the securities transaction are considered to coincide with each
other. A transaction that depends upon fraud has a tighter relationship to the
misrepresentation or omission than does a transaction that merely coincides
with the fraud. When a securities transaction depends upon a fraud, or when
fraud induced the transaction, the two are inextricably linked. Without the
fraud, the securities transaction in question would never and could never
happen. Under this linguistic analysis, the fraud appears to be absolutely
necessary in producing the securities transaction in question. Congress did
not contemplate such a stringent standard when drafting SLUSA.123 The
Eleventh Circuit standard blunts the congressional intent behind SLUSA
and provides plaintiffs a greater ability to bring meritless suits. As such, the
Fifth Circuit properly rejected it.
b. The Second Circuit: Romano v. Kazacos
The Second Circuit addressed the “in connection with” requirement in
2010 in Romano v. Kazacos and held that, where plaintiff’s claims “turn on
injuries caused by acting on misleading investment advice,” or where the
claims “necessarily allege,” “necessarily involve,” or “rest on” the purchase
or sale of securities, such alleged fraud coincides with, and therefore is in
connection with, the securities transaction.124
In Romano, the court heard consolidated appeals from plaintiffappellants, Xerox and Kodak retirees, who filed class action complaints in
state court alleging state-law claims.125 They claimed that Morgan Stanley
employees had misrepresented that the retirees’ investments would provide
sufficient income should they choose to retire early.126 Plaintiffs elected to
receive a lump sum retirement package and subsequently left their
employment after being advised by their Morgan Stanley consultants.127
Appellants’ retirement accounts then “suffered ‘disastrous’ declines in
value” and their standard of living plummeted due to the increased financial
hardship they faced.128
Appellants filed a class action claim against Morgan Stanley and its
Senior Vice President, Kazacos, alleging “common law claims of
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
contract,”129 and a host of other state-law claims. Upon removal to federal
court, appellants’ motion to remand for lack of federal jurisdiction was
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 522.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 515–16.
Id. at 516.
Id.
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denied and the court determined that “defendants’ alleged misconduct
‘coincided’ with appellants’ securities purchases.”130 The district court held
that SLUSA preempted the state-law class action and dismissed the
claim.131
On appeal, the Second Circuit looked “beyond the face of the amended
complaints to determine whether they allege securities fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of covered securities.”132 The court noted that
Zandford interpreted “in connection with” to also mean “coincide,” which
is to be construed broadly in scope.133 Because the Supreme Court never
explicitly defined “coincide,” the circuit courts have used interpretive
techniques to give dimension to the term.
The Second Circuit’s standard was a more “exacting” one than that
required by the Supreme Court’s coincide test.134 The more exacting
standard would serve to weaken the effect of the PSLRA’s heightened
pleading requirements because fewer claims would be precluded when
deemed not to have met the “in connection with” test. In those instances,
fewer cases would be removable to federal court and subject to dismissal
under SLUSA. The Fifth Circuit was concerned that the Second Circuit’s
standard was not entirely representative of Congress’ purpose in enacting
SLUSA135 because, under the more exacting standard, corporate defendants
are subject to a greater potential of frivolous litigation than would be the
case if the standard precluded more cases.
2. The Ninth Circuit Promulgates the Best Test: Madden v.
Cowen & Co.
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the “in connection with” and “coincide”
language in its 2009 case of Madden v. Cowen & Co.136 In Madden, sixtythree shareholders sued an investment bank alleging state-law claims for
“misleading them in connection with the sale of their closely held
corporation to a publicly traded acquiring corporation.”137 When the case
was removed to federal court, the district court held that the suit was
“properly removed and precluded under SLUSA.”138 On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court reversed, holding that the district court had employed the

130. Id. at 517.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 519 (citing Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.2d 294, 298 (3d Cir.
2005)).
133. Id. at 521.
134. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 519 (5th Cir. 2012).
135. Id. at 519.
136. Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Id. at 961.
138. Id. at 962.
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wrong standard in making its determination that SLUSA preempted the
claim.139
The class of plaintiffs in this case, mostly physicians who owned a
majority share of St. Joseph’s Medical Corporation (which in turn owned a
majority share in Orange Coast Managed Care Services), brought suit in the
disastrous wake of a merger with FPA Medical Management.140 St. Joseph
and Orange Coast’s management retained Cowen, an investment bank, to
“look for prospective buyers, give advice regarding the structure of any
potential sale, and render a ‘fairness opinion’ regarding any proposed
transaction.”141 After Cowen determined that the proposed merger would be
“financially fair”142 to St. Joseph and Orange Coast shareholders, the board
of directors approved the merger and the transaction was soon completed.
Shortly after closing, FPA “issued a calamitous first-quarter report” and two
months later, “FPA declared bankruptcy, with a share price that was
approximately 0.5% of its value at the time of the merger agreement.”143
Madden thereafter sued Cowen in California state court alleging
negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence under state law.144
Cowen removed the case to federal court seeking to invoke SLUSA’s
preemption provision. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand
and dismissed the case applying the SLUSA preclusion.145
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the significance of the SLUSA
legislation in working toward Congress’ intent to limit the potential liability
of defendants and “deter or at least quickly dispose of” improper usage of
the class action vehicle.146 The Ninth Circuit held that a misrepresentation is
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities when there is “a
relationship in which the fraud and the stock sale coincide or are more than
tangentially related.”147 The court found that Cowen’s misrepresentations
caused plaintiffs to vote in favor of the FPA merger and exchange their
existing stock for that of FPA.148 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that they
“would not have done so absent Defendants’ fairness opinion . . . that the
transaction was fair, from a financial point of view.”149

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. (“Under the merger agreement, FPA would acquire all outstanding shares of St. Joseph
and Orange Coast. In exchange, FPA would issue shares of its stock valued at $60 million to St.
Joseph and Orange Coast shareholders.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 964.
147. Id. at 966 (emphasis added) (citing Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.
2002)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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The court held that the misrepresentations and omissions alleged were
“more than tangentially related” to plaintiffs’ purchase of the FPA securities
in the merger transaction, and were therefore “in connection with the
purchase or sale” of the securities.150 A securities transaction that coincides
with an alleged fraud when that transaction is more than tangentially related
to the fraud is a broad, yet not over-inclusive, formulation of the nexus that
satisfies the “in connection with” language. Such nexus reflects the proper
balance of policy considerations and legislative intent that led to the
enactment of SLUSA.
C. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TEST
Interpreting the “coincide” language was a matter of first impression for
the Fifth Circuit; therefore, it was necessary for the court to establish a
standard to apply in Roland and in future cases brought under SLUSA.
Looking to the Supreme Court’s language in Zandford and Dabit, the Fifth
Circuit noted that, despite an absence of controlling authority, it did not
“write on a blank slate.”151 In Dabit, the Court looked to the language of
Rule 10b-5 to assist it in determining the reach of the “in connection with”
requirement. Employing traditional statutory interpretation methods, the
Court noted that the SLUSA language exactly mirrored the Rule 10b-5
language. It therefore concluded that Congress, aware of the overlap in
language, intended for it to have the same meaning in SLUSA as in Rule
10b-5.152 The Fifth Circuit, in turn, evaluated and analyzed the language
provided by the Supreme Court and looked to the varying interpretations its
sister circuits employed to meet the required test.
The Fifth Circuit chose to adopt the standard promulgated by the Ninth
Circuit when interpreting the “coincide” language found in the Supreme
Court cases.153 In making its decision to provide a precise interpretation, the
court considered various circuit court cases that had already addressed the
issue. Believing the Ninth Circuit’s test—when the fraud and the purchase
or sale of the security are more than tangentially related—to be the most
compelling, the justices of the Fifth Circuit adopted that standard as the
court’s own.

150. Id.
151. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2012).
152. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (citing
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).
153. Roland, 675 F.3d at 520.
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III. WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ADOPTED THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S TEST
A. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: ROLAND V. GREEN
In 2012,154 the Fifth Circuit in Roland v. Green heard a consolidated
appeal of three cases155 where plaintiffs sought to use the state class action
vehicle to recover damages for “an alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi
scheme.”156 In the first case, the SEC sued the Stanford Group Company
(SGC) and its corporate entities, including Stanford International Bank
(SIB), for their alleged role in the Ponzi scheme.157 The companies had sold
certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by SIB, and SIB had represented for
fifteen years that it “consistently earned high returns on its investment of
CD sales proceeds.”158 In reality, however, SIB had to “use new CD sales
proceeds to make interest and redemption payments on pre-existing CDs,
because it did not have sufficient assets, reserves and investments to cover
its liabilities.”159 Such misrepresentations were the key issue before the
court when the SEC alleged fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5.
In the second suit, two groups of Louisiana investors “sued the SEI
Investments Company (“SEI”), the Stanford Trust Company (the “Trust”),
the Trust’s employees, and the Trust’s investment advisors (collectively, the
“SEI Defendants”) for their alleged role in the Stanford Ponzi scheme.”160
They alleged a multitude of state-law claims including “breach of contract,
negligent representation, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair trade practices,
and violations of the Louisiana Securities Act.”161 Specifically, they
claimed that SEI made several misrepresentations, which “induced them
into using their IRA funds to invest in the CDs.”162 Among the many
representations that SEI made to plaintiffs were that the CDs were a good
investment, that independent auditors verified the value of the SIB assets,
and that the CDs would produce double-digit returns.163 The SEI defendants
154. The Supreme Court granted the Roland defendants’ petition for certiorari on January 18,
2013 to address whether SLUSA precludes a securities fraud class action suit where plaintiffs
purchase securities in reliance on material misrepresentations from financial advisors and other
professionals. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Willis of Colorado, Inc. v. Troice, 133 S. Ct.
977 (2013) (No. 12-86); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S.
Ct. 978 (2013) (No. 12-88). Such an inquiry invariably leads to an analysis of the correct meaning
of the “in connection with” and “coincide” language of SLUSA and Rule 10b-5.
155. Roland, 675 F.3d at 506. The district court in which the SEC action was filed ordered all
suits against Stanford International Bank and related third parties to be filed as ancillary
proceedings to the SEC action. Id. at 508.
156. Id. at 506.
157. Id. at 508.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 508–09.
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sought removal to the district court claiming SLUSA precluded the claim,
and after the action was consolidated with the others against SEI, plaintiffs
made a motion to remand back to state court.164
The third case of the consolidated appeal involves a group of Latin
American investors who sued SIB’s insurance brokers and lawyers under
Texas law in two separate class actions.165 Plaintiffs alleged that SIB’s
insurance brokers represented to them that the CDs were a good investment
for various reasons, including that “the CDs were safe and secure . . . SIB’s
portfolio produced consistent, double-digit returns . . . and the CDs’ high
return rates . . . greatly exceeded those offered by commercial banks in the
United States.”166 After plaintiffs filed suit, defendants again claimed that
SLUSA preclusion applied and moved to dismiss the class actions.
The question at issue in each of the above cases was whether “the
plaintiff alleges the use of misrepresentations, omission, or deceptive
devices ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.’”167
When determining the strength of the nexus linking the alleged fraud to the
securities transaction, the district court applied the Eleventh Circuit’s test.
SLUSA preclusion would apply if the defendants’ misrepresentations
regarding the supposedly highly profitable and safe CDs induced plaintiffs
to purchase the financial products, or alternatively that the scheme
depended upon the securities transaction.168
The district court found that SLUSA preclusion applied and dismissed
the action.169 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed, finding that the district
court had applied an improper standard for determining the “in connection
with” requirement. Applying the correct legal standard, the Fifth Circuit
determined that SLUSA did not preclude plaintiffs’ claims.170 The court
held that “the purchase or sale of securities (or representations about the
purchase or sale of securities) is only tangentially related to the fraudulent
schemes alleged . . . [and therefore] that SLUSA does not preclude the
Appellants from using state class actions to pursue their recovery.”171
B. THE NEED FOR A PRECISE DEFINITION TO MEET THE
“COINCIDE” THRESHOLD
The Fifth Circuit was not bound to employ any of its sister circuits’
tests for determining the scope of the “in connection with” requirement.172
164. Id. at 509.
165. Id. Plaintiffs alleged only “civil conspiracy” rather than material misrepresentations or
omissions against their attorneys, the Proskauer defendants. Id.
166. Id. at 508–09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 510.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 511.
170. Id. at 522.
171. Id. at 506–07.
172. Id. at 512.
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It could have simply chosen to establish its own test to define “in
connection with” and “coincide.” So why did the court elect to adopt the
Ninth Circuit’s test as its own? First, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits did not “attempt to define the ‘coincide’
requirement, but merely discuss[ed] what connection above and beyond
‘coincide’ is sufficient.”173 These tests insufficiently defined coincide. The
respective definitions and analyses in each of those cases were of little help
to the Fifth Circuit, and as such, it properly dismissed them as a guide to its
decision.174 To handle a matter of first impression, the Fifth Circuit aimed
to more precisely define its test. The above-mentioned cases narrowly or
insufficiently held what it meant for an alleged fraud to be “in connection
with” a securities transaction175 and thus provided minimal help in the Fifth
Circuit’s exercise of statutory interpretation.
Regarding the three remaining circuits176 that the Fifth Circuit deemed
relevant in steering it toward an understanding of the “coincide” language,
it is not entirely obvious why the court adopted an existing standard rather
than creating its own to add to the range of standards already in play.
Arguably, the court did not want to add to the “melange” of tests177 already
applied by the circuit courts to maintain consistency in the application of
federal securities law regarding covered and uncovered securities.178
Roland’s language reflects an admiration of how the Ninth Circuit adopted
its test and determined its final result.179 It is possible that, had the Fifth
Circuit failed to look to its sister circuits for guidance, it would have
proffered a more than tangentially related standard, or something nearly
identical. While this note cannot determine how the justices of the court
actually chose their coincide standard, the process outlined in Roland in
coming to its conclusion expresses the justices’ fundamental agreement
with both the standard applied in the Ninth Circuit and the policy
considerations bolstering such a standard.180
To avoid requiring completely new tests for each slight factual
variation, future courts should be able to apply a standard in a consistent,
yet flexible manner. Here, the Fifth Circuit used keen judgment and logic
when it analyzed a precise and easy-to-apply standard for determining
whether fraud exists in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
Id. The three remaining circuit courts the Fifth Circuit addressed were the Second, Ninth,
and Eleventh. Id.
177. Id. at 510.
178. See id. at 517. See generally SEC Testimony, supra note 49, at 3 (noting one of SLUSA’s
goals was to “adopt a uniform standard for the prosecution of certain securities fraud class
actions.”).
179. Roland, 675 F.3d at 519–20.
180. See id.
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The court did not want a definition that was so broadly construed that there
was no clear line marking where a given instance of fraud went beyond the
proposed test or whether it precisely met the court’s threshold.181 The Fifth
Circuit sought an exacting definition in the Roland opinion, one with a clear
demarcation of when a securities transaction coincides with an alleged fraud
and when it does not. Such a definition was adopted in the more than
tangentially related standard.
The district court in Roland had employed the Eleventh Circuit’s test,
which the Fifth Circuit found to be “too stringent a standard.”182 This
standard would make it easier for plaintiffs to sue corporations than the
court found necessary or appropriate if such fraud could be alleged under
that standard.183 If few nexuses satisfied the “in connection with” or
“coincide” requirements, then the standard applied would allow for a
significant amount of litigation and potential corporate liability. Had the
court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, it, in essence, could have
returned the state of securities fraud class action litigation to the same
condition that led Congress to enact SLUSA to begin with.184
When considering the spectrum of possible standards to influence the
development of its own, the Fifth Circuit intended to make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to bring suit than what other circuits have found appropriate.185
The court rightfully invoked a standard favorable to corporate defendants,
and looked more skeptically at the plaintiffs’ bar.186 Protecting the national
securities markets in the aggregate was a key goal in enacting SLUSA187
and the Fifth Circuit supported that goal in reading the “in connection with”
language broadly.
While this note argues that the Fifth Circuit properly rejected the
Second Circuit’s narrower construction of the “coincide” language, it is still
rather curious that the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the latter’s
interpretation, given the Second Circuit’s influence on corporate and
securities matters.188 The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction includes New York,
the major center of corporate, financial, and business activity—potentially
the largest amount of corporate liability in the United States. The Second
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
See id. at 517.
Such a result would be contrary to Congress’ purpose in enacting SLUSA—that is, to close
the loophole that the PSLRA left open. Shannon, supra note 1, at 331.
185. Roland, 675 F.3d at 520.
186. Id.; see, e.g., Henriques, supra note 10.
187. See SEC Testimony, supra note 49, at 4.
188. Roland, 675 F.3d at 519; see Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After
Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 253 (2012) (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has played the principal role in shaping this [Section 10(b)]; because it
encompasses New York City, it has had the opportunity to hear a disproportionate number of
securities fraud cases.”).
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Circuit’s test, as compared to that of the Ninth and now Fifth Circuits’ tests,
makes it comparatively easier for plaintiffs to bring securities fraud claims
because of its stricter preclusion standard. Such a holding would appear to
favor injured investors over defendants. By dissecting the language of the
standard, fewer claims of fraud necessarily allege, necessarily involve, or
rest on189 the sale or purchase of securities than those that are more than
tangentially related to each other. Therefore, there could be more instances
where the claim continues past the pleadings under the Second Circuit’s
jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit, alternatively, stressed the necessary
protection of corporate defendants in adopting the more than tangentially
related standard.
Similarly, looking to Delaware’s prominence within the Third Circuit,
it may be asked why the court never evaluated a Third Circuit case in
making its decision.190 It is possible that the Fifth Circuit foresaw itself
acting to influence a future Third Circuit case in determining the nexus of a
fraudulent scheme and a securities transaction. In securities law
jurisprudence, both New York and Delaware—and more broadly, the
Second and Third Circuits—have been highly influential and act as a guide
to other courts in corporate securities matters.191
If, after Roland, the Third Circuit were to directly address the question
posed in Roland, it may be that the Fifth Circuit wanted to persuade the
Third Circuit to employ the more than tangentially related standard. Under
such circumstances, three circuits would employ the same standard, which
would provide more continuity regarding how federal securities fraud class
action cases are decided. Such a result reflects the “congressional
preference for national standards for securities class action lawsuits
involving nationally traded securities.”192 Considering that the interpretation
from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits protects corporate defendants more than
the Second Circuit’s interpretation, it would be a strong message in support
of congressional intent and policy considerations should the Third Circuit
accept the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ test rather than that of the Second.
C. A COMPARISON OF THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS’
STANDARDS
The Fifth Circuit made it clear in Roland that the Second and Ninth
Circuits’ opinions were among the most important ones it considered when
189. Roland, 675 F.3d at 522.
190. See Pinto & Branson, supra note 69, at 15. The outcome of SLUSA and Rule 10b-5
litigation may disproportionately affect states within the Third Circuit, Delaware in particular, as
many public companies—and more than half of Fortune 500 companies—are Delaware
companies. Id.
191. Id. at 17; see also Boehm, supra note 188, at 253.
192. Roland, 675 F.3d at 507 (citing In re Enron, 535 F.3d 325, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)); see Apel,
supra note 11, at 631.

2013]

"In Connection With" Requirement Under SLUSA

585

developing its standard. It employed the Eleventh Circuit’s test only as a
starting point193 and subsequently rejected the Eleventh Circuit test when it
reversed the district court.194 The court then evaluated the remaining two
circuits’ tests in a fair amount of detail. The results of both tests, whether
the alleged fraud necessarily alleges, necessarily involves, or rests on the
securities transaction or whether the alleged fraud is more than tangentially
related to the securities transaction, have the potential to provide rather
different results in 10b-5 litigation.
In the case of the Second Circuit standard, the test for SLUSA
preclusion is fairly strict and narrow. It follows logically that there would
be relatively few instances where the alleged fraud and the securities
transaction at hand actually meet the standard in which SLUSA would
mandatorily bar the action. Because of its narrow reach, plaintiffs could
allege a greater number of claims and defendants would be exposed to an
increased risk of defending or settling these suits. This is not a welcome
risk for corporate participants in the securities markets.195 It is ironic that
the Second Circuit, home to New York’s incredibly important capital
markets, subjects corporate defendants to more potentially frivolous
lawsuits under this strict standard. The Fifth Circuit noted that such an
approach was not the goal of Congress196 and was not what the Supreme
Court contemplated when it announced the “coincide” standard in Zandford
and Dabit.
The Ninth Circuit, alternatively, provides corporate defendants greater
protection against potentially frivolous lawsuits. Those states within the
Ninth Circuit—Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington—though not widely regarded as major
hubs of corporate and securities law, provide greater protection for
corporate defendants and the national securities markets. Such protection
aligns with the goals of federal securities law197—protection of investors
and the national stock exchanges to promote efficient growth and
stability.198
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit’s 2012 decision of Roland v. Green proscribed the
meaning of the “in connection with” and “coincide” language the Supreme

193.
194.
195.
196.

Roland, 675 F.3d at 518.
Id. at 522.
Cox et al., supra note 54, at 360; see Apel, supra note 11, at 631.
O’Hare, supra note 2, at 360 (“The legislative intent underlying SLUSA—foreclosing the
circumvention of the procedural reforms contained in the Reform Act—is certainly an important
reason why some courts have refused to allow plaintiffs to plead around SLUSA.”).
197. See SEC Testimony, supra note 49, at 4. The federal securities laws and the SEC’s
“primary mission is investor protection.” Id.
198. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).

586

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

Court held as necessary to apply SLUSA preclusion.199 In the process of
carefully interpreting the meaning of coincide, the court evaluated other
circuit court decisions and grappled with whether they provided persuasive
guidance in its own decision.200 The court first undertook an exercise in
statutory interpretation, looking at the text201 of SLUSA and the SEC’s Rule
10b-5. It next looked to broader policy considerations, the protection of the
national securities markets,202 and legislative intent when establishing its
standard.203 From the Fifth Circuit’s careful scrutiny of its sister circuits’
tests determining the nexus connecting an alleged fraud to a securities
transaction, the court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit’s best reflected
congressional intent.204 The Ninth Circuit’s test—whether the alleged fraud
is more than tangentially related to the purchase or sale of a covered
security—aimed to preclude much of the frivolous litigation that may stifle
business activity and financially drain corporations. The Fifth Circuit
rightly held that such a standard illuminates the truest meaning of the
coincide nexus as expounded by key Supreme Court decisions.
The Fifth Circuit definition establishes where the SLUSA standard
begins and the circumstances under which preclusion is met. It finds a
crucial balance between the notion that “the statute must not be construed
so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve
[covered] securities into a violation of § 10(b),”205 and that it must provide
sufficient protection against the immense risk of frivolous lawsuits unique
to Rule 10b-5 litigation.206 Since Congress’ enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC’s subsequent promulgation of Rule
10b-5, at issue has been, and will continue to be, maintaining the delicate
balance between vindicating plaintiffs’ rights and protecting corporate
defendants from unwarranted liability. The Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the
more than tangentially related test furthers this goal.
The more than tangentially related test supports legislative intent to
quell Congress’ concerns about abuses in securities fraud class action
litigation. The language is, and should continue to be, construed broadly to
protect corporations from a wide range of potentially frivolous and
meritless suits brought for the sole purpose of extracting a high
settlement.207 Yet, the standard is narrow enough in scope to allow plaintiffs
to bring meritorious class actions to recover for legitimate losses sustained
at the hand of corporate defendants. Recognizing the health of the national
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See generally Roland, 675 F.3d at 511–20.
Id. at 512–20.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 512 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (emphasis added)).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 10.
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securities markets as the backbone of the American economy, Congress
prioritized their security in enacting SLUSA to close the loophole that the
PSLRA inadvertently left open.208 The Supreme Court has subsequently
held that the legislative intent and policy considerations are crucial aspects
of SLUSA that should be granted deference to ensure the legislation
accomplishes its proffered goals.209 The Fifth Circuit, in turn, properly
interpreted the “in connection with” and “coincide” language210 to support
legislative intent and protect corporate defendants individually, and national
securities markets generally, from the heightened risk of vexatious litigation
in federal securities fraud class actions.
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208. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78.
209. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); O’Hare, supra
note 2, at 338.
210. This note argues for the Fifth Circuit’s standard in interpreting the coincide language of
SLUSA, rather than for the Court’s application of that standard to the facts in Roland. It is
important to note that an arguably illogical tension now exists between the District Court and the
Fifth Circuit in the proper application of the law. The District Court employed a stricter standard,
but held that the alleged fraud fell within that nexus, yet the Fifth Circuit adopted a broader test
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